The Coalition des Forces Républicaines (CFR) must become the lever for an orderly exit from the crisis

By Marie Denise Claude, Le National, on September 8, 2026

Haiti can no longer afford a prolonged transition while the Republic collapses.

The creation of the Coalition des Forces Républicaines (CFR), bringing together 44 parties and organizations from the ten departments and the diaspora, constitutes a political event that should not be treated as just another coalition in the already fragmented landscape of Haitian politics.

The CFR must now assume a much greater responsibility: to become the political instrument of a national negotiation for an orderly, peaceful and constitutionally defensible exit from the crisis.

 

The moment of truth

The question is no longer whether the current government can still promise an improvement in the situation.

The issue is much more serious:

Can Haiti continue to function with a government that is unable to produce the results essential to the survival of the Republic?

Armed violence continues to ravage the country. Families are displaced, territories are falling outside the authority of the state, and the population lives in a state of structural insecurity.

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In this context, political responsibility requires us to face reality.

A government that fails to guarantee security, the free movement of citizens and the minimum conditions for holding credible elections must accept that its continued rule may itself become a legitimate subject of national negotiation.

This is not a political witch hunt.

This is a matter of state responsibility.

The CFR should not simply demand departure: it must negotiate a transition

The request for Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé to step down should not be presented as a partisan demand or as a desire to seize power.

It must be formulated as the first element of a crisis exit agreement.

The CFR should therefore propose a clear mechanism to national and international actors:

1. Immediate opening of a high-level political dialogue.

2. Presentation of a documented observation on the failure of current transition mechanisms.

3. Proposal for a negotiated resignation of the Prime Minister within an agreed timeframe.

4. Implementation of a new transitional architecture limited in time and in its missions.

5. Formation of a consensus government, composed on the basis of competence, integrity and the ability to restore the authority of the State.

6. Adoption of a precise timetable for security, institutional reform and the organization of elections.

7. International guarantee of support, without substituting for national sovereignty.

In other words:

The CFR should not only negotiate the departure of a Prime Minister. It must negotiate the conditions for the future.

That's where its true strength lies.

Transforming the 44 organizations into a single political voice

Forty-four organizations do not automatically constitute a political force.

They become so when they speak with one voice.

The CFR's first battle will therefore be internal: discipline, coherence and unity of position.

Parallel negotiations, personal agendas, and contradictory statements must be avoided.

The CFR should appoint a small negotiating committee, with a written mandate, to discuss with:

the authorities in place;

parties and organizations not members of the CFR;

CARICOM;

international partners;

the economic and social sectors;

civil society;

religious and professional organizations.

The CFR must speak to everyone, but must not be captured by anyone.

At CARICOM: a proposal, not a complaint

The announced meeting with CARICOM on September 7 should be considered a decisive moment.

The CFR delegation should not arrive with a simple list of grievances.

She must arrive with a plan to resolve the crisis.

The message should be simple:

“We did not come to ask the international community to choose Haiti’s next leader. We came to present a Haitian proposal that would allow Haitians to rebuild their state and quickly return to electoral legitimacy.”

This distinction is fundamental.

The CFR must demonstrate that it is not seeking to replace one transition with another endless transition.

She wants to organize the exit from the transition.

The government must answer for the results

The government had already been tasked with creating the security and institutional conditions necessary for the elections.

After several months, the country is still facing a major security crisis.

The question therefore becomes unavoidable:

What results were obtained?

And if the results are not forthcoming, we must have the republican courage to recognize that the current method has reached its limits.

That's what democracy is.

This is not a relentless pursuit of power.

This is not a refusal to acknowledge failure.

This is not the permanent use of the transition as a justification for inaction.

Democracy also means knowing when to step down when you are no longer able to effectively fulfill the assigned mission.

A negotiated departure to avoid another confrontation

The CFR must therefore defend a firm, but responsible, position:

The Prime Minister's departure must be negotiated, structured and peaceful.

There must be neither institutional chaos, nor a prolonged power vacuum, nor an extraconstitutional adventure.

We need an exit transition, with a limited mandate, a public roadmap and a credible election deadline.

It is precisely this approach that could give the CFR genuine national and international legitimacy.

The time for speeches is over.

Haiti no longer needs another political conference where everyone comes to present their ambitions.

Haiti needs a national agreement to resolve the crisis.

Today, the CFR has a significant political map: 44 organizations united around a common approach.

But this card is only valuable if it is played intelligently.

The CFR must become:

an interlocutor;

a negotiator;

a guarantor of unity;

a solutions producer;

and above all, a mechanism for transitioning between the failure of the current transition and the return to democratic legitimacy.

The time has come to ask the question respectfully, but directly:

If the government is no longer capable of guaranteeing security, restoring the authority of the state, and creating the conditions for credible elections, who will have the republican courage to propose another way?

The CFR could be that way.

But for that to happen, it must cease to be just a coalition of 44 signatures.

It must become a national negotiating force capable of proposing the orderly departure of the Prime Minister, the formation of a consensus government and an irreversible timetable towards elections.

Haiti is no longer asking for promises.

Haiti demands results.

And when results do not come, the Republic must know how to pave the way for another solution.

 

Posted Oct. 18, 2026